\u010co sa stane, ak Amerika nesplat\u00ed svoj dlh? Investori by prinajmen\u0161om po\u017eadovali vy\u0161\u0161ie \u00farokov\u00e9 sadzby na kompenz\u00e1ciu rizika, \u010do by viedlo k spr\u00edsneniu \u00faverov\u00fdch podmienok na svetov\u00fdch trhoch. V ka\u017edom pr\u00edpade by u\u017e Ameriku zachv\u00e1tila pr\u00edsna fi\u0161k\u00e1lna \u00faspora. Bez mo\u017enosti po\u017ei\u010da\u0165 si dodato\u010dn\u00e9 prostriedky by vl\u00e1da bola n\u00faten\u00e1 zn\u00ed\u017ei\u0165 v\u00fddavky o v\u00fdpadok medzi be\u017en\u00fdmi da\u0148ov\u00fdmi pr\u00edjmami a v\u00fddavkami. <\/p>\n
Analytici z Brookings Institution odhaduj\u00fa toto zn\u00ed\u017eenie cez noc na pribli\u017ene 25 %. Pod\u013ea Moody’s Analytics by tak\u00e9to zlyhanie sp\u00f4sobilo okam\u017eit\u00fd pokles ekonomiky takmer o 1 %, pri\u010dom by miera nezamestnanosti st\u00fapla z 3,4 % na 5 %, \u010do by malo za n\u00e1sledok stratu zamestnania pribli\u017ene 1,5 mili\u00f3na \u013eud\u00ed.<\/p>\n
V kr\u00e1tkodobom scen\u00e1ri, ak Kongres nakoniec zv\u00fd\u0161i dlhov\u00fd strop, trhy by sa mohli zotavi\u0165. Bankrot trvaj\u00faci len nieko\u013eko dn\u00ed by po\u0161kodil reput\u00e1ciu Ameriky a pravdepodobne by viedol k recesii. So zru\u010dn\u00fdm riaden\u00edm by sa to v\u0161ak dalo zmierni\u0165 a vyhn\u00fa\u0165 sa tomu, aby sa stal no\u010dnou morou.<\/p>\n
Rozsiahlej\u0161ie zlyhanie by predstavovalo v\u00e4\u010d\u0161ie nebezpe\u010denstvo. Ekon\u00f3m agent\u00fary Moody’s Mark Zandi to prirovn\u00e1va k potenci\u00e1lnemu \u201eplachtov\u00e9mu momentu\u201c s odkazom na jese\u0148 roku 2008, ke\u010f Kongres p\u00f4vodne neschv\u00e1lil Program na z\u00e1chranu probl\u00e9mov\u00fdch akt\u00edv, \u010do sp\u00f4sobilo krach glob\u00e1lnych trhov. Ak by dlhov\u00fd strop zostal nezv\u00fd\u0161en\u00fd aj po zlyhan\u00ed, n\u00e1sledky by mohli by\u0165 podobne v\u00e1\u017ene.<\/p>\n
Rada ekonomick\u00fdch poradcov Bieleho domu odhaduje, \u017ee v prv\u00fdch mesiacoch poru\u0161enia by akciov\u00fd trh mohol klesn\u00fa\u0165 o 45 %. Moody’s predpoved\u00e1 pokles pribli\u017ene o 20 % a zv\u00fd\u0161enie nezamestnanosti o p\u00e4\u0165 percent, \u010do povedie k strate zamestnania pribli\u017ene 8 mili\u00f3nov Ameri\u010danov. S vl\u00e1dou obmedzenou dlhov\u00fdm stropom by nebola schopn\u00e1 reagova\u0165 na pokles fi\u0161k\u00e1lnymi stimulmi, \u010d\u00edm by sa preh\u013abila h\u013abka recesie.<\/p>\n
Vlna zni\u017eovania \u00faverov\u00fdch ratingov by tieto probl\u00e9my e\u0161te viac zhor\u0161ila. Po\u010das predch\u00e1dzaj\u00faceho vyrovnania sa s dlhov\u00fdm stropom v roku 2011 Standard & Poor’s zn\u00ed\u017eila rating Ameriky na \u00farove\u0148 pod jej najvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed rating AAA. Po bankrote by ratingov\u00e9 agent\u00fary \u010delili obrovsk\u00e9mu tlaku, aby ich nasledovali. <\/p>\n
To by mohlo spusti\u0165 \u0161kodliv\u00fa re\u0165azov\u00fa reakciu, pri\u010dom in\u0161tit\u00facie podporovan\u00e9 americkou vl\u00e1dou, ako je Fannie Mae, k\u013e\u00fa\u010dov\u00fd zdroj financovania hypot\u00e9k, tie\u017e za\u017eij\u00fa zn\u00ed\u017eenie ratingu. To by n\u00e1sledne viedlo k vy\u0161\u0161\u00edm hypotek\u00e1rnym sadzb\u00e1m, \u010do by podkopalo \u017eivotne d\u00f4le\u017eit\u00fd sektor nehnute\u013enost\u00ed. V\u00fdnosy z podnikov\u00fdch dlhopisov by st\u00fapli, ke\u010f sa investori hnali za hotovos\u0165ou, a banky by obmedzili p\u00f4\u017ei\u010dky, \u010do by vyvolalo v\u0161eobecn\u00fa paniku.<\/p>\n
Objavili sa aj nepredv\u00eddate\u013en\u00e9 a bizarn\u00e9 zvraty. Za norm\u00e1lnych okolnost\u00ed s\u00fa meny kraj\u00edn, ktor\u00e9 nespl\u00e1caj\u00fa svoje z\u00e1v\u00e4zky, zna\u010dne znehodnoten\u00e9. V pr\u00edpade americk\u00e9ho prelomu sa v\u0161ak investori m\u00f4\u017eu spo\u010diatku hrn\u00fa\u0165 do dol\u00e1ra a pova\u017eova\u0165 ho za bezpe\u010dn\u00fd pr\u00edstav po\u010das kr\u00edzy, ako to zvy\u010dajne b\u00fdva. V dom\u00e1com prostred\u00ed sa \u013eudia m\u00f4\u017eu uch\u00fdli\u0165 k vkladom v bank\u00e1ch, ktor\u00e9 s\u00fa pr\u00edli\u0161 ve\u013ek\u00e9 na to, aby zlyhali, preto\u017ee verili, \u017ee Feder\u00e1lny rezervn\u00fd syst\u00e9m ich ochr\u00e1ni bez oh\u013eadu na okolnosti. <\/p>\n
Napriek tomu by ak\u00e9ko\u013evek zn\u00e1mky odolnosti pri\u0161li s kolos\u00e1lnym varovan\u00edm: Amerika by rozbila d\u00f4veru, ktor\u00fa do nej svet u\u017e dlho vklad\u00e1. Ot\u00e1zky o alternat\u00edvnych men\u00e1ch a finan\u010dn\u00fdch syst\u00e9moch, ktor\u00e9 by nahradili dol\u00e1r, by sa stali naliehavej\u0161ie. Akon\u00e1hle je viera rozbit\u00e1, nie je \u013eahk\u00e9 ju obnovi\u0165.<\/p>\n
Postupn\u00fd posun smerom k \u0161t\u00e1tnej kontrole vo finan\u010dnom syst\u00e9me: Ako to bude vyzera\u0165 uprostred bud\u00facej nestability?<\/p>\n
Historick\u00fd vz\u0165ah medzi financiami a \u0161t\u00e1tom m\u00e1 hlbok\u00e9 korene, pri\u010dom bankov\u00e9 domy vystupuj\u00fa ako veritelia poslednej in\u0161tancie vo\u010di vl\u00e1dcom v ohrozen\u00ed. Karta sa v\u0161ak obr\u00e1tila a banky teraz predstavuj\u00fa hrozbu pre stabilitu \u0161t\u00e1tu. Tento posun vyvolal zv\u00fd\u0161en\u00fd doh\u013ead zo strany ofici\u00e1lnych in\u0161tit\u00faci\u00ed. Pred storo\u010d\u00edm znamenal z\u00e1sah \u0161t\u00e1tu po\u010das Ve\u013ekej hospod\u00e1rskej kr\u00edzy v\u00fdznamn\u00fd zlom. Glob\u00e1lna finan\u010dn\u00e1 kr\u00edza v rokoch 2007-2009 tento trend e\u0161te viac posilnila. Ned\u00e1vne nepokoje posunuli bankov\u00fd syst\u00e9m \u010falej na ceste \u0161t\u00e1tnej kontroly.<\/p>\n
Feder\u00e1lna korpor\u00e1cia pre poistenie vkladov (FDIC), americk\u00fd regul\u00e1tor, 11. m\u00e1ja zverejnila, \u017ee ve\u013ek\u00e9 banky v krajine m\u00f4\u017eu \u010deli\u0165 strat\u00e1m vo v\u00fd\u0161ke 16 mili\u00e1rd USD v d\u00f4sledku zlyhania Silicon Valley Bank (svb) a Signature Bank. Navy\u0161e mo\u017eno bud\u00fa musie\u0165 prispie\u0165 e\u0161te viac, aby zmiernili krach in\u00e9ho verite\u013ea, Prvej republiky. \u00daradn\u00edci v Spojen\u00fdch \u0161t\u00e1toch, Brit\u00e1nii a Eur\u00f3pe v s\u00fa\u010dasnosti zva\u017euj\u00fa, \u010di poskytn\u00fa\u0165 rozsiahlej\u0161iu ochranu bankov\u00fdch vkladov. Tieto opatrenia s\u00fa najnov\u0161\u00edm prejavom klesaj\u00facej sily b\u00e1nk a stup\u0148uj\u00faceho sa vplyvu \u0161t\u00e1tu. \u0160t\u00e1t v posledn\u00fdch mesiacoch z\u00edskava \u010doraz v\u00e4\u010d\u0161iu prevahu v r\u00f4znych oblastiach vr\u00e1tane poistenia vkladov, n\u00fadzov\u00fdch \u00faverov a regul\u00e1cie kvality akt\u00edv.<\/p>\n
Bank\u00e1ri aj regula\u010dn\u00e9 org\u00e1ny uzn\u00e1vaj\u00fa, \u017ee zmeny implementovan\u00e9 v \u010dasoch otrasov maj\u00fa tendenciu vydr\u017ea\u0165. Andrew Haldane, b\u00fdval\u00fd z Bank of England, v\u00fdsti\u017ene prirovnal z\u00e1chrann\u00fa sie\u0165 pon\u00fakan\u00fa bank\u00e1m k \u201epr\u00edli\u0161 natiahnut\u00e9mu elastick\u00e9mu materi\u00e1lu\u201c, ktor\u00fd sa po roztiahnut\u00ed u\u017e nikdy \u00faplne nevr\u00e1ti do p\u00f4vodnej ve\u013ekosti. Okrem toho u\u017e mo\u017eno pozorova\u0165 z\u00e1blesky mo\u017en\u00e9ho bud\u00faceho roz\u0161\u00edrenia jurisdikcie \u0161t\u00e1tu. To by mohlo zah\u0155\u0148a\u0165 v\u00fdrazne pr\u00edsnej\u0161ie nariadenia o kolater\u00e1li alebo ne\u00famyseln\u00fd posun smerom k \u00fazkemu bankov\u00e9mu syst\u00e9mu. Vyn\u00e1ra sa ot\u00e1zka: Ako \u010faleko sa e\u0161te roz\u0161\u00edri dosah \u0161t\u00e1tu?<\/p>\n
Aby sme pochopili z\u00e1kladn\u00fa dynamiku, je nevyhnutn\u00e9 zv\u00e1\u017ei\u0165 poistenie vkladov \u2013 opatrenie, ktor\u00e9 sa \u010dasto pripisuje prezidentovi Franklinovi Rooseveltovi. Roosevelt sa v\u0161ak spo\u010diatku postavil proti jej zavedeniu v roku 1934, preto\u017ee sa ob\u00e1val, \u017ee by to viedlo k samo\u013e\u00fabosti v riaden\u00ed b\u00e1nk, preto\u017ee poisten\u00ed vkladatelia sa u\u017e nebud\u00fa ob\u00e1va\u0165 o bezpe\u010dnos\u0165 svojich prostriedkov. <\/p>\n
Aj ke\u010f mnoh\u00e9 krajiny spo\u010diatku v\u00e1hali s prijat\u00edm tak\u00e9hoto poistenia kv\u00f4li podobn\u00fdm obav\u00e1m, nakoniec sa roz\u0161\u00edrilo, \u010dasto realizovan\u00e9 v \u010dase kr\u00edzy. T\u00fato jar americk\u00ed regul\u00e1tori i\u0161li nad r\u00e1mec predch\u00e1dzaj\u00facich opatren\u00ed t\u00fdm, \u017ee retrospekt\u00edvne chr\u00e1nili vkladate\u013eov v svb, Signature Bank a efekt\u00edvne v Prvej republike. Prezident, minister financi\u00ed a predseda Feder\u00e1lneho rezervn\u00e9ho syst\u00e9mu v r\u00f4znej miere zd\u00f4raznili, \u017ee v\u0161etky bankov\u00e9 vklady s\u00fa bezpe\u010dn\u00e9.<\/p>\n
N\u00fadzov\u00e9 p\u00f4\u017ei\u010dky s\u00fa \u010fal\u0161ou oblas\u0165ou, v ktorej rastie \u00faloha \u0161t\u00e1tu. Banky potrebuj\u00fa verite\u013ea poslednej in\u0161tancie, preto\u017ee s\u00fa vo svojej podstate nestabiln\u00e9. Vklady s\u00fa splatn\u00e9 na po\u017eiadanie; \u00favery s\u00fa dlhodob\u00e9. \u017diadna in\u0161tit\u00facia tak nebude ma\u0165 peniaze po ruke, ke\u010f sa ich vkladatelia do\u017eaduj\u00fa masovo. <\/p>\n
Walterovi Bagehotovi sa pripisuje rada, \u017ee aby sa predi\u0161lo kr\u00edze, centr\u00e1lni bank\u00e1ri by mali vo\u013ene po\u017ei\u010diava\u0165 solventn\u00fdm in\u0161tit\u00faci\u00e1m, zabezpe\u010den\u00e9 dobr\u00fdm kolater\u00e1lom a za sank\u010dn\u00fa \u00farokov\u00fa sadzbu. Ned\u00e1vno zaveden\u00fd \u201eprogram bankov\u00e9ho financovania\u201c zo strany Fedu tento v\u00fdrok odmieta. Oce\u0148uje dlhodob\u00e9 cenn\u00e9 papiere na nomin\u00e1lnu hodnotu, aj ke\u010f ich trh v\u00fdrazne diskontuje, a neuklad\u00e1 takmer \u017eiadnu pokutu nad trhov\u00fa \u00farokov\u00fa sadzbu.<\/p>\n
\u010c\u00edm v\u00e4\u010d\u0161ia je poistka, t\u00fdm viac d\u00f4vodov mus\u00ed vl\u00e1da diktova\u0165, ak\u00e9 rizik\u00e1 m\u00f4\u017eu banky podst\u00fapi\u0165. V tom spo\u010d\u00edva tret\u00ed zdroj pl\u00ed\u017eivej \u0161t\u00e1tnej kontroly: regul\u00e1cia kvality akt\u00edv. Banky v\u0161ade podliehaj\u00fa pravidl\u00e1m, ktor\u00e9 obmedzuj\u00fa rizikovos\u0165 ich akt\u00edv a ur\u010duj\u00fa, ko\u013eko kapit\u00e1lu musia dr\u017ea\u0165. Skuto\u010dn\u00e9 riziko prich\u00e1dza, ke\u010f preferencie politiky zasahuj\u00fa do pravidiel poskytovania \u00faverov. <\/p>\n
V Amerike sa to u\u017e deje na hypotek\u00e1rnom trhu, ktor\u00e9mu dominuj\u00fa dva vl\u00e1dou podporovan\u00e9 podniky: Fannie Mae a Freddie Mac. Tieto dve in\u0161tit\u00facie teraz spolo\u010dne ru\u010dia za \u00faverov\u00e9 riziko za viac ako polovicu hypot\u00e9k. Ich z\u00e1ruky umo\u017e\u0148uj\u00fa 30-ro\u010dn\u00e9 hypot\u00e9ky s pevnou \u00farokovou sadzbou a splatnos\u0165ou, ktor\u00e9 Ameri\u010dania o\u010dak\u00e1vaj\u00fa. Pom\u00e1haj\u00fa tie\u017e vysvetli\u0165, pre\u010do americk\u00fd finan\u010dn\u00fd syst\u00e9m zn\u00e1\u0161a v\u00e4\u010d\u0161ie \u00farokov\u00e9 riziko ako eur\u00f3psky, kde s\u00fa hypot\u00e9ky s pohyblivou sadzbou be\u017en\u00e9.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u010co sa stane, ak Amerika nesplat\u00ed svoj dlh? Investori by prinajmen\u0161om po\u017eadovali vy\u0161\u0161ie \u00farokov\u00e9 sadzby na kompenz\u00e1ciu rizika, \u010do by viedlo k spr\u00edsneniu \u00faverov\u00fdch podmienok na svetov\u00fdch trhoch. V ka\u017edom pr\u00edpade by u\u017e Ameriku zachv\u00e1tila pr\u00edsna fi\u0161k\u00e1lna \u00faspora. Bez mo\u017enosti po\u017ei\u010da\u0165 si dodato\u010dn\u00e9 prostriedky by vl\u00e1da bola n\u00faten\u00e1 zn\u00ed\u017ei\u0165 v\u00fddavky o v\u00fdpadok medzi be\u017en\u00fdmi da\u0148ov\u00fdmi […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-28575","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-exo-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28575","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28575"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28575\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28575"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28575"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/extraslovensko.sk\/spravy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28575"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}